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Earlier this year, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group comprised of Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the
USA was established to facilitate the peace process in Afghanistan. However, there has been little
progress to date due to the Taliban’s refusal to participate in talks. Menaal Munshey writes that
Pakistan’s reluctance to use its influence over the Afghan Taliban has been part of the issue, and
suggests that China’s increasing diplomatic influence in the region could play an important role in
moving things forward.
At the heart of Afghanistan’s ongoing political, economic and security challenges is the struggle of
the Afghan state. In recent years, the policy of the United Nations and the United States has been to
support the Afghan government’s negotiations with the Taliban to establish a viable peace process. However, the
Taliban refuses to participate, thereby limiting the impact of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) established
by the United States in early 2016.
Although it is unlikely that productive negotiations will occur in the QCG setting, there is room for effective diplomacy
between members of the QCG (Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the USA) who are key stakeholders in the push
for peace. As the US presence and influence decreases in Afghanistan, it is time for China to step up as a facilitator
of peace talks. Given the high levels of casualties and displacement, the urgency to build a coherent strategy and
secure a peaceful future for Afghanistan continues to mount.
Barriers to peace
Pakistan is a key player in the peace process as it is thought to exercise the most influence over the Afghan Taliban,
particularly as the state has publicly acknowledged the presence of the Afghan Taliban leadership in Pakistan.
Despite this, they have failed to persuade the Taliban to participate in talks so far. Ahmed Rashid contends that
Pakistan could exert more influence over the Taliban, but doesn’t appear to be interested in doing so. In particular,
Pakistan’s military appears to have no inclination to build a single coherent policy  on the Taliban because it still
views them in part as allies against India. For example, in June six Taliban militants “surrendered” to the Pakistan
military under unknown circumstances. On the other hand, the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the province
bordering Afghanistan, recently agreed to provide $2.86 million to a madrassah where Taliban leadership and other
terrorists have been trained. So decisive action is not being taken, and the Taliban and its splinter groups continue to
take lives in Pakistan and the reluctance to genuinely facilitate peace in Afghanistan is increasingly frustrating for
stakeholders and other members of the QCG.
In May, Afghanistan threatened to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council if Pakistan did not
honour its commitment to take strong military action against Taliban leadership present in Pakistan. The Afghan
government now views its neighbour as a bigger challenge than the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. At the same time, it is
increasingly threatened by the Taliban: 2015 saw the highest number of Afghan civilian casualties since US military
action began in 2001. In recent offensives including a twin suicide attack in the heart of Kabul, the Taliban continues
to attack state machinery and kill and kidnap government employees. Shocking reports also show the group’s use of
child sex slaves to infiltrate state security networks, and launch insider attacks.
Internally, Afghanistan’s leadership risks facing a legitimacy deficit as pressure mounts on the government to take
action. The Afghan government struggles with structural problems, and has so far shown limited progress in
consolidating their position, while the Taliban continues to make gains. Felbab-Brown proposes that addressing
basic governance functions and boosting the capacity of the security sector will help drive the Taliban to the
negotiating table, and ultimately assist the peace process.
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The Afghan Taliban Chief Mullah Mansour was killed in May in the first drone attack in Balochistan and the second
outside FATA. It was a sign of US frustration with Pakistan, and a method of coercing the Taliban to come to the
table. However, the drone strike failed to weaken the Taliban or convince them to join peace talks. Instead, it
increased distrust between the Taliban, Pakistan and the US. In retaliation, Pakistan announced its plan to deport
1.5 million refugees back to Afghanistan, to remind the US of their key role in the success of the peace process. The
Taliban reacted swiftly to the death of Mansour with a change in leadership and in doing so consolidated its support
base. Whereas Mansour was seen as motivated by greed, the new leader, Akhundzada, is seen as an ideologically
driven and legitimate leader. As a religious leader, he has issued a number of Islamic fatwas , taking a particularly
brutal view on women and minority rights. There is no evidence that this change in leadership has weakened the
Taliban’s position or made it more susceptible to peacemaking. Instead, talks have stalled, and recent attacks show
a demonstration of strength and a belief that a military victory is possible.
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China as a growing diplomatic player
To overcome the threat of the Taliban, a clear strategy is required. In this scenario, there is an opportunity for
effective and timely diplomacy from the region’s other power player, China.
China can play a positive role in the region by collaborating with Pakistan in bringing the Taliban to the negotiation
table. Last year China announced a $46 billion investment project in Pakistan, dwarfing the amount of aid the US
provides to Pakistan, and thus increasing their influence. However, for the Pakistani establishment to overcome its
historical leanings towards the Taliban, and play a positive role in the peace process, China will have to exert
political pressure on Pakistan.
China has begun to exercise stronger diplomacy. In August , China held the inaugural High Level Military Leader
Meeting on Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism in Counter Terrorism with the armed forces of
Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. The purpose was to build regional consensus on counter terrorism
measures and make efforts towards “peaceful development”. This serves China’s strategic interests of increasing
trade routes, specifically One Belt One Road (OBOR) and blocking the independence movement in Xinjiang. It may
also signal an acceptance within the Chinese government that the QCG is now dysfunctional. It appears that China
is adopting the role of soft mediator. In July, the Taliban claimed a delegation had visited China  in the first visit to any
country under new leadership, a claim which was indirectly confirmed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The
circumstances of these talks are unclear, however, the Afghan government was critical of China  for engaging in
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these discussions and providing a platform to the Taliban.
Despite this criticism, China has taken a bold step by engaging the Taliban in dialogue. It remains to be seen
whether this is a part of a long-term sustained diplomatic strategy which can extract greater cooperation from
Pakistan. Without an effective strategy from the members of the QCG and stakeholders in the peace process, the
Taliban appears to be the only player with a coherent plan, which is detrimental to peace and dangerous for the
Afghan people.
This post gives the views of the author, and not the position of the South Asia @ LSE blog, nor of the London School
of Economics. Please read ourcomments policy before posting.
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